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the current dependence on fossil fuel sales. While such 
a policy may work in the short-term, economic decline 
and irrelevance are on the horizon as technology changes 
increase non-Russian fossil fuel production and speed 
the adoption of alternative energies. Since the current 
regime fears any sort of change as destabilizing, the sit-
uation will remain stable only until the next surprise. 
Most likely this will be a revolt from below as disgrun-
tled workers compare their declining standard of living 
with the corrupt leadership.
Myth #4. Russian Civil Society Has Influence. Sure 
some groups can affect policy changes around the edges, 
such as policies addressing the treatment of orphans, the 
destruction of stray dogs, or construction in urban areas, 
but such groups have essentially no voice on national pol-
icies that matter, such as the federal budget or the deploy-
ment of Russian troops abroad. Most people, young and 
old, are apolitical and are focused on their careers, their 
families or their hobbies. Most believe that they cannot 
change anything any way, so why bother even trying. 
Such actions are rational at the individual level.
Myth #5. There Exists such a thing as a Meaningful 
Russian Nation on this Planet. The Kremlin propa-
ganda machine likes to promote the Russian nation, 
both in terms of the ethnic Russians and the broader 
multi-ethnic patchwork of ethnic groups who live inside 
the Russian Federation. It even seeks to build ties with 
Russian-speakers living abroad, in some cases, with suc-
cess. But, in fact, there is no nation as such. Rather the 
“nation” is a collection of individuals who are pursuing 
their short-term, individual interests. This collection of 
individuals does what it has to in order to get by. Except 
for a few isolated cases, money is a much greater moti-
vator than any national idea. The fact that most people 
chose to vote for Putin, rather than speaking out hon-
estly about Russia’s problems, proved that once again.
Myth #6. U.S. Government Engagement with the 
Putin Regime is a Good Idea. Working with Putin is 
pointless for the U.S. government because it only legiti-
mizes a corrupt and illegitimate regime. Mutual assured 
destruction is the best guarantor that there will be no 
major wars. The U.S. needs to defend itself against Rus-
sian aggressions of all kinds. But it should spend its 
energy cleaning up its own house and the mounting 
domestic problems. To the extent that there is engage-
ment, there should be more contacts on the cultural and 
scientific levels, but even these are increasingly difficult 
given the Russian obsession with “foreign agents” and 
“undesirable organizations.” The fundamental problems 
of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention into 
the U.S. elections block progress for any U.S. admin-
istration. The U.S. will not be able to build any kind 
of relationship with Russia while the special prosecutor 
is looking into ties between the Trump campaign and 
Russia and addressing the possibility of the obstruc-
tion of justice.
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Putin’s Challenges
By Jeronim Perović, University of Zurich
Introduction
The overwhelming vote for Putin in the presidential 
elections of March 18, 2018, is not an expression of 
optimism, but a sober choice for stability and predict-
ability. Russians want a better life and are in favor of 
reforms, but in times of economic difficulties and inter-
national tensions, they prefer national unity and conti-
nuity. Putin has been masterfully playing on the people’s 
fears of radical change, and has been using the image of 
a hostile West in order to rally the Russians behind the 
flag. But the president lacks a clear vision for a modern 
Russia, let alone a concrete program of reforms. His key 
goal is to maintain the system of power he created, rely 
on a strong Russian military, and keep society in check.
The President’s Rhetoric
Putin is aware of Russia’s challenges. At least at the rhe-
torical level. During his state of the nation address on 
March 1, 2018, it came as no surprise that Putin spoke 
at some length about the need for economic and social 
reform. After all, with the presidential elections only 
two weeks away, this was a barely disguised campaign 
speech. Putin boldly declared that Russia must “assert 
itself among the five largest global economies, and its 
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per-capita GDP must increase by 50 percent by the 
middle of the next decade.” He named healthcare, educa-
tion, science, technology and infrastructure as key tasks 
for the future. Most astonishing (or cynical, depending 
on one’s perspective) was his testimony that to achieve 
a change for the better, an expansion of “freedom in 
all spheres,” the strengthening of “democratic institu-
tions, local governments, civil society institutions and 
courts,” and the opening of Russia to the “world and to 
new ideas and initiatives” were necessary. He portrayed 
a country in need of change, and made it clear that he 
is ready to embrace it.
Such words would normally make the heart of every 
liberal-minded person jump—if only Putin meant what 
he said. Since the Russian president has been talking 
about the necessity of structural reform for a long time, 
everybody knows that nothing really dramatic is likely 
to happen any time soon. But most Russians do not seem 
to mind. To be sure, Russians know perfectly well what 
democracy is. They are aware that their democratic free-
doms and choices have been gradually shrinking since 
Putin came to power some eighteen years ago.
Moreover, they read the signs and understand that 
the economic indicators are anything but promising. 
Real household income has been declining for the fourth 
consecutive year, while the poverty rate has been grow-
ing. Some of Russia’s regions are in dire straits, and 
more and more people are discontent with their per-
sonal situation. But public order, stability and a strong 
state are important values as well. In fact, many see 
these as integral elements of a functioning democracy. 
The tragedy for many Russians was not the disintegra-
tion of the Soviet empire but the virtual dissolution of 
the Russian state that followed. The privatization of the 
1990s turned into a ruthless grab for state assets, mak-
ing a few people very rich, but driving millions into pov-
erty and ill health.
Cultivating the Myth of the “Wild” 1990s
Putin has been a master in cultivating the myth that 
everything that happened during the chaotic years of the 
1990s was essentially bad, and that it was only thanks to 
him that the country’s “time of troubles” was overcome, 
law and order was restored, the specter of the country’s 
territorial disintegration averted, and economic decline 
halted. This is not the whole truth, of course. The coun-
try’s economic upturn during Putin’s first two terms as 
president was also a result of the structural reforms of 
the 1990s. But these seem to be subtleties in the eyes 
of those who suffered, and the majority of the popula-
tion subscribe to the Kremlin’s point of view. Russians 
want a better life, but they dread the prospect of falling 
back into the chaos of the 1990s.
Many therefore see no alternative to Putin. He got 
almost 77 percent of the vote in the presidential elec-
tion because many people chose stability which Putin 
impersonates. They see Putin as the one who made 
Russia strong again, enabling Russia to defend itself 
against seemingly hostile international forces; moreover, 
as shown by public opinion polls, most Russians con-
tinue to support the government’s tough line in domes-
tic and foreign policy affairs. This all fits perfectly well 
with Putin’s own agenda, as Russian propaganda feeds 
on people ’s belief in an anti-Russian Western conspir-
acy and the deep seated fears of radical change and rev-
olution, using the cases of Ukraine, Libya or Syria as 
effective deterrents.
To be sure, the Russian government has been talking 
about reform for a long time, and many reasonable pro-
grams and plans have since been drafted and discussed; 
and almost ritually, in every state of the nation address, 
Putin has referred to the need to diversify the economy 
away from its dependence on raw materials and the 
necessity to support small- and medium-sized business. 
But the stability he has built rests to a large degree on 
a firm grip of the state over key sectors of the economy, 
mostly oil and gas, and is held together by a system of 
patronage built around the institution of the presidency.
A significant strengthening of small- and medium-
sized business would potentially mean the rise of a class 
of entrepreneurs who are likely to be less easy to con-
trol than a handful of loyal oligarchs. The same goes 
for the delegation of real power and autonomy to the 
regions, the empowerment of local governments, or the 
strengthening of civil society organizations. All this 
would undermine the system Putin created over the 
past two decades and that has worked so well for him 
and the people dependent on it.
What Really Matters: Russian Military 
Power
Putin is unlikely to allow change that has the potential 
to disrupt the system he built, which he views as the only 
guaranteed way of keeping Russia politically and eco-
nomically stable and its society under control. But this 
is only one part of the story: Putin firmly believes that 
a highly centralized form of governance is an essential 
condition for the state to channel enough resources into 
the Russian great-power project. If Putin during the first 
half of his two-hour state of the nation address made 
his audience believe that his first priority is indeed the 
“well-being of the people and the prosperity of Russian 
families,” he later made certain that everybody under-
stood what his real priorities were: to re-store Russia’s 
rightful place in the world, largely through the build-up 
of its military capabilities. Putin was sure to portray this 
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as a mission of peace, not war. He sees “Russia’s growing 
military power” as a “solid guarantee of global peace,” 
underlining that, much like during the Cold War, only 
a strong Russia will make certain to restore and preserve 
“strategic parity and the balance of forces in the world.”
As if speaking at an international weapons exhibi-
tion, Putin dedicated over an hour of his talk to explain-
ing the newest military technology in great detail, dis-
playing videos showing nuclear-powered missiles that 
can fly at supersonic speed with an “unlimited range,” 
which are “absolutely invulnerable to any air or missile 
defense system” and are able to hit any target on the 
planet. While he mentioned “missile” some sixty times 
during his talk, and “nuclear” twenty-seven times, the 
word “democratic” popped up only twice and “civil 
society” only once. Thus, whatever he was discussing 
in the first section of his speech paled in light of what 
he was sharing with his audience later.
His message to the people at home and abroad was 
clear: Russia is not only back on its feet but able to 
actively shape international relations; this is good for 
Russia and the world, and he, Putin, will do everything 
in his power to ensure that it stays that way. “Russia is 
not threatening anyone” but wants to “sit down at the 
negotiating table and devise together a new and relevant 
system of international security and sustainable devel-
opment for human civilization.” In short: if the world 
has ignored Russian interests in the past, now they will 
listen and eventually talk to Russia, or so Putin believes.
Maintaining the Current System
Clever macroeconomic politics and a rise in oil prices 
have provided the state with enough financial means to 
alleviate social hardship and allocate some of the money 
to the social sphere, not only to the modernization of 
Russia’s military. But Putin firmly believes that only if 
Russia is strong (and Russia’s military is currently the 
most important indicator of how strength is measured) 
will it succeed in effectively protecting its foreign pol-
icy and security interests and maintain national unity at 
home. Therefore, it is clear where the state’s budgetary 
priorities lie, if choices need to be made: in the defense 
and security sector, not so much in healthcare, educa-
tion and other civil projects. So, this is Putin’s mission 
for the next years: allow change if such change does 
not pose any threat to the current system of power and 
patronage, but do everything that is necessary to max-
imize Russia’s standing in the world, preferably at low 
cost to the Russian economy. Putin is not even trying 
to be enigmatic. His vision, at least when it comes to 
the creation of a new international order, is abundantly 
clear. His plan for serious economic and social reform 
is far less so.
For the time being, it seems the Russians are willing 
to tighten their belts and carry the costs of Putin’s great-
power mission. The president can count on the people’s 
support, but the Russians will want something tangible 
in return at some point in the future.
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Agenda and Challenges for Putin’s New Term
By Nikolay Petrov, National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE), Moscow
Finishing the Transition from the “Epoch of 
Carrots” to the “Epoch of Sticks”
Most likely the next six years of actions by the govern-
ment will be driven by three major groups of processes: 
(1) the political regime transformation with the prep-
aration for transfer of power from Putin the President 
to Putin the leader in another capacity; (2) unpopu-
lar economic reforms aimed at the adaptation to a new 
economic and foreign policy environment, which were 
postponed for almost three years due to the long federal 
electoral cycle; and (3) repair and reconstruction of the 
primitive and archaic political system, established at a 
time of “fat cows” and no longer capable of facing new 
challenges. Of course, any attempt to implement serious 
economic reforms, which are badly needed, will cause 
increasing tensions and crises in the system which has 
not changed since 2005 and needs to learn anew how 
to evolve peacefully.
This all means that (1) the Government should be 
overhauled to become a real team to lead the ship of state 
through the reefs, instead of being a board of directors 
to keep the balance between major shareholders; (2) the 
